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Résumé / Abstract
L’industrie aérospatiale est aux prises avec une concurrence intense à
l’échelle mondiale, notamment avec la venue de nouveaux concurrents de la région
Asie-Pacifique. Cette situation impose une pression supplémentaire sur la sous-
traitance actuelle dans ce secteur. Dans ce contexte, il apparaît essentiel de mieux
comprendre ce qui caratérise les sous-traitants de classe mondiale. Pour répondre
à cette préoccupation, une étude comparative de 384 entreprises sous-traitantes fut
réalisée aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni et au Canada, en faisant appel au concept
de * benchmarking + et à une des perspectives d’alignement retrouvée dans la théorie
de la contingence et connue sous le nom de * déviation du profil idéal +. Un profil
distinct semble émerger en ce qui a trait aux compétences technologiques et
managériales détenues par les entreprises les plus performantes. Les compétences
critiques qui sont communes aux entreprises sous-traitantes de classe mondiale
provenant des trois pays sont intangibles, difficiles à imiter, ou difficilement
transférables. Ceci laisse entrevoir que les sous-traitants actuels de calibre
international possèdent des compétences qui seront difficilement reproductibles dans
le court terme. Ce ne serait pas le cas pour les sous-traitants moins performants qui
seront aux prises dans un avenir prochain avec la venue de nouveaux concurrents
en provenance des pays en voie d’industrialisation.
The aerospace industry faces fierce and rapidly changing competition
worldwide which exercises a considerable amount of strain on its manufacturing
subcontractors. In this context, it becomes essential to gain a better
understanding of what constitutes the most critical capabilities of the world-class
subcontractors. Drawing heavily on the concept of benchmarking and of fit as
profile deviation, this paper allows to identify the most critical capabilities of the
best performing firms. Results are derived from an international comparison of
384 subcontracting firms operating in the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada. A very
distinct profile emerges from the best subcontractors in terms of their acquired
technological and managerial capabilities. The most critical capabilities which
are common to subcontractors of all three countries are either intangible,
difficult to imitate or not easily transferable. This leads us to believe that the best
subcontractors hold a partcular competitive advantage which will be difficult for
others to replicate, at least in the short term. This is not however the case for the
less performing subcontractors who could well be subjected in the not too far
future to the competitive pressures arising from the new industrializing countries.
Mots Clés : Aérospatiale, sous-traitance, compétences critiques, globalisation
Keywords : Aeronautics, subcontractors, critical capabilities, globalization
JEL : O32
11.  Introduction
For most nations, the aerospace industry represents a key strategic sector as it is
viewed as a symbol of competence and pride, an incubator of advanced
technologies, a generator of highly specialized jobs and, most of all, an engine of
growth and wealth.  As a result, the aerospace industry is heavily subsidied by most
governments and faces fierce and rapidly changing competition worldwide.  The
arrival of powerful new players is drastically increasing the already high levels of
competition.  New players are created by mergers such as those between Martin-
Marietta and Lockheed, Boeing and Rockwell and, more recently, Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas.  The emergence of newly industrialized nations, such as
Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India and Singapore, which are eager to
develop their own aerospace industries is also adding to the list of new players.
If competition is fierce among prime contractors, aerospace subcontractors also
operate in a very difficult and competitive environment.  Strong pressures are
obviously placed on subcontractors by prime contractors that have rationalized and
sometimes drastically reduced their local subcontracting base.  However, the main
pressures come from the existence of an ever-increasing global network of high-
performing subcontractors.  The erosion of the traditional local subcontracting base
is, to a large extent, due to the growth in demand in the big emerging markets.
Colossal demand for products and services is being experienced in every subsector
of the industry,  whether in civilian aeronautics as a result of the flow of travellers
from, to and within the Asia-Pacific region, which is expected to amount to half the
world’s traffic by the year 2000 [1], or in the defence sector where countries such
as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia are actively
engaged in military build-up [2].  This is also the case in the space sector, where
spending is increasing rapidly in countries such as Japan, China or India although,
as yet, total spending in that particular sector is still largely concentrated in the
U.S.A. [3].  With such enormous purchasing power, Asian countries can exert
considerable influence on Western prime contractors with regard to the choice of
location for their subcontracting activities.  In fact, Asian countries are already part
of a global network.  For example, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia
ship major components and sub-assemblies directly to airframe and engine
manufacturers in Europe and North America.  Asian subcontractors from these
countries are gradually acquiring the capabilities which will enable them to
undertake more complex tasks.  Can Western subcontractors really compete in such
a context?  The answer depends to a significant extent on the willingness of Western
subcontractors to build and maintain world-class capabilities.
This paper will therefore focus on the most critical capabilities of the best
performing manufacturing subcontractors in the aerospace industry.  The specific
2objectives are as follows:
(i) to propose, analyze and define a set of critical technological and managerial
capabilities for aerospace subcontractors;
(ii) to identify the critical capabilities of the best performing subcontractors;
(iii) to assess the gaps between the best and the other subcontractors in order to
provide a better understanding of the most critical capabilities required by
aerospace subcontractors.
Since aerospace is a global industry, these three objectives will be pursued from an
international perspective.  We will thus present empirical evidence from 384 small
and medium-sized subcontractors (upper limit of 500 employees) operating in the
U.S.A. (140), the U.K. (109) and  Canada (135).
2.  Main conceptual issues
The above-mentioned objectives clearly require one to specify the meaning of such
concepts as capabilities and performance.  Furthermore, the presence of capabilities
and, in particular, the relationship between capabilities and performance are
modified by factors such as the size of the subcontracting firms and the types of
relationships the prime contractors have with their subcontractors.  We will briefly
discuss these conceptual issues.
2.1  Looking for critical capabilities
While the term “resources” usually refers to financial, technological, physical and
human assets, “capabilities” comprise an organization's capacities to deploy its own
resources.  Firm’s capabilities which are broadly based, encompassing the entire
value chain [4: 66], can be centered within one function such as production, R&D
or marketing or within several functions, as would be the case with Total Quality
Management (TQM), for instance, and must combine the effective use of several
types of resources.  Critical capabilities of aerospace subcontractors were first
assessed on the basis of a thorough literature review and then validated in 22 case
studies.
Technological superiority is certainly a key driver of long-term performance in the
aerospace industry and, as such, technological capabilities are essential.  R&D
investments are quite indicative of the absorptive capacity of subcontractors [5],
while technological scanning is probably the second-best means of acquiring and
maintaining the required levels of knowledge and skills [6].  Employees' technical
3and scientific expertise constitutes one of the most strategic organizational assets
in  subcontractors' technological base, especially in a high-technology sector.  The
use of advanced computer-based technologies is linked to competitive dimensions
such as quality, time, flexibility and cost [7], as are manufacturing improvement
programs such as TQM or Just-In-Time (JIT).  In this study, we did not retain the
level of use and mastery of specific high-potential technologies such as superplastic
forming, metallic powder, lost wax molding or precision forming since they are not
generic across the industry; instead we consider the degree of perceived
exclusiveness of know-how related to the firm's product.  This capability allows for
comparisons of firms within the industry.
Possessing technological capabilities is an a priori and necessary but not sufficient
condition for ensuring high levels of competitiveness, as these capabilities must be
managed optimally.  Successful technological innovation therefore depends on
critical managerial capabilities.  In particular, managerial skills, especially in terms
of the coordination and integration of activities and functions [8], the ability to
ensure durable relationships with customers and suppliers, and marketing skills [9]
are obviously essential.  Equally important are self-reinforcing capabilities which
depend on historical settings and past performance such as the positive reputation
of the subcontracting firm among customers and suppliers and its financial stability.
Although the last two capabilities are no guarantee of future performance in all
cases [10], they introduce a favorable bias in the awarding of contracts which, in
turn, contributes to the gradual building of capabilities.
2.2  Identifying the underlying dimensions of performance
The competitive stance of aerospace manufacturing subcontractors is based mainly
on five dimensions.  First of all, quality is an overriding, non-negotiable
requirement: the highest standards must be met.  This is a fact of life in the
aerospace industry.  Second, quality of customer service is clearly important to
maintain long-term relationships with prime contractors.  Moreover, prime
contractors may ask their subcontractors to give technical support directly to final
customers such as airlines [9].  Third, time-based competition is omnipresent in any
industry and, although it presents very long lead times (for instance, for commercial
airplanes), the aerospace industry is no exception [11].  Fourth, flexibility, i.e. the
ability to switch quickly and/or adapt to special conditions or requirements, whether
in terms of product, layout, skills, variations of volume or use of equipment, is also
required from subcontractors.  Fifth, cost also constitutes a prime competitive
advantage, especially with the increased competition of subcontractors located in
 Underbidding is certainly a way to gain market share, as it forces direct competitors to make a difficult1
decision: lose a sale or lower prices below cost. Financial packages such as the “Walk Away Lease” or
the “Deferred Seat Plan” also place the financial burden on prime contractors who, in turn, shift the
pressure to the subcontractors.
 The question of subsidies has long been a bone of contention between the U.S.A. and Europe. For2
example, the Americans claim that Airbus Industrie got more that $25 billion in subsidies over the last
two decades whereas the Europeans estimate that military and space contracts account for $41 billion
of indirect subsidies to American firms [18].
 As one subcontractor summarizes the situation: “the prime contractors are simply pushing down all of3
their own pressures on us”. In almost all 22 case studies, subcontractors from Europe and North America
felt they had to excel on all five dimensions and, for some, the demands from prime-contractors were
unrealistic. 
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low-cost production countries. Indeed underbidding  and questionable government1
subsidies are still current and controversial issues since, other things being equal2 
cost is often the bottom line.  In fact, no clear-cut trade-offs can be allowed between
these five competitive dimensions: the best-performing aerospace subcontractors
are expected to excel on each of these dimensions  or, at least, to improve on all3
dimensions, although the relative rates of improvement may well differ from one
dimension to the next [12].
2.3  Controlling for other factors
When assessing the relationship between critical capabilities and a firm’s
performance, several factors which could modify this relationship should be
controlled for. Among these factors (or control variables) let us mention size, which
still plays a role, even in SMEs, the number of large customers and the percentage
of sales they represent, the level of prime contractors' expectations in terms of the
adjustments required from the subcontracting firms (difficulty, variability,
magnitude and time horizon for these changes) and the level of prime contractors'
direct influence over decisions made by subcontractors such as the adoption and
implementation of new technologies or the training of employees.
3.  Analytical and methodological issues
Strategic benchmarking, defined as "the continuous search for and application of
significantly better practices that lead to superior competitive performance" [13: 2],
strongly suggests the need to identify the critical capabilities of best manufacturing
subcontractors in the aerospace industry.  In contingency theory, the perspective of
"fit as profile deviation" [14] requires one to demonstrate that the degree of
j
n,m
i,j'1
$i (xSij&xci)2
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adherence (fit or alignment) to an ideal profile has positive implications for
performance.  We will draw heavily on these two approaches, both of which call for
the development of an ideal profile of critical capabilities.
3.1  Development of an ideal profile
In order to arrive at an ideal profile, previous studies used the mean scores of a
"calibration sample", usually defined as the top 10 percent of high-performing
companies [see, for example, 15].  Such an empirically derived profile is not only
close to the concept of strategic benchmarking, but is also rather straightforward
and intuitively appealing. Nevertheless, it must overcome some difficulties if it is
to become credible.  First, since the aerospace industry is a global industry relying
on global outsourcing, the best subcontractors cannot be identified from a single-
country perspective.  Second, the best subcontractors (calibration sample) should
display a significantly different set of critical capabilities from the other
subcontractors (study sample).  Finally, the various capabilities should carry
different weights depending on their relative importance.  The development of an
ideal profile therefore requires careful attention to the stability, robustness and
validity of the empirical results and, consequently, imposes stringent conditions on
the research design and statistical analyses.
3.2  The degree of adherence to the ideal profile
The closer a subcontracting firm is to the ideal profile, the better it is expected to
perform.  Likewise, significant deviations from this ideal profile should result in
poor performance.  The overall degree of adherence to the ideal profile corresponds
to the multivariate perspective of fit as profile deviation, and its classical measure
is the weighted Euclidian distance between two vectors [15, 16].  The graphical
representation is given in Figure 1 and its mathematical equivalent is as follows:
where
x  represents the score for each critical capability i for theSij
subcontractor j that pertains to the study sample;
Figure 1
Graphical representation of “fit as profile deviation”
x xsij ci−
score of capability i
for subcontractors
j in the study
sample =
average score of capability i for firms in
the calibration sample (top performing
firms) = xci
list of i critical
capabilities
i = 1
n
low level of
demonstrated
capabilities
high level of
demonstrated
capabilities
xsij
Source: adapted from Venkatraman [14]
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x'  represents the ideal profile or the mean scores for eachci
critical capability i for the best-performing subcontractors (i.e.
all firms pertaining to the calibration sample);
$ consists of standardized beta coefficients for each capabilityi
i in the multiple regression conducted in the calibration
sample.
 The prime contractor had ranked its own subcontractors from “the best” to “the worst”. The self4
evaluation of each subcontractor (although the scores for all five dimensions were slightly higher in
absolute terms) resulted in a similar ranking; “the best” still being “the best” and “the worst” still being
“the worst”. Poor performers were quite candid about their own weaknesses: in particular delivery times,
flexibility and cost in particular received very low scores.
 For example, the total number of subcontracting firms varies quite drastically from country to country.5
 Various official directories in each country provide the basic information for carrying out these tests.6
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The overall degree of adherence, which would more correctly be termed the overall
degree of misalignment, indicates the contribution of all critical capabilities to the
performance of subcontracting firms. Yet it fails to indicate the relative importance
of the score for a specific capability, which is a prime concern from both a practical
and a theoretical perspective.  We will therefore also examine more closely the
degree of adherence for each capability.
3.3  Research design
The choice of variables and the operationalization of their measures were
thoroughly pre-tested in previous case studies: 22 subcontracting firms were
investigated in Europe (7), Canada (10) and the U.S.A. (5).  More specifically, the
performance of these subcontractors was assessed by one prime contractor and then
subjected to a self-evaluation by the top manager of each firm. The correspondence
between the two assessments  was astonishingly high (Kendall's test of agreement,4
p = 0.8975 where p = 1 indicates perfect agreement).
A large-scale survey was then carried out in three countries that differ widely with
respect to their aerospace subcontracting base : the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada.5  
Three well-known universities (one per country) mailed out the questionnaires
addressed to the top managers of manufacturing subcontracting firms.  The survey
design allowed for quota sampling and the pre-set objective was to obtain at least
120 questionnaires from each country in order to carry out the necessary
comparative multivariate analysis.  With 156, 148 and 151 firms responding from
the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada, respectively, the objective was met and no follow-
up was done.  In order to carry out meaningful benchmarking, the responding firms
had to be representative of the population, and comparable goodness of fit tests
revealed no particular bias with respect to size or regional coverage within one
country .6
Could comparisons or benchmarking be conducted between all of these firms?
Several steps were followed to ensure that comparisons were adequate.  First, all
 This is actually slightly less than the 10 top percent as a sharp decrease in performance is observed7
between the 37th firm and the 38th firm.
 384 firms minus 37 firms (best-performing firms) minus 38 firms (worst-performing firms).8
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responding firms were manufacturing firms actively involved as subcontractors in
the aerospace industry.  Second, an upper limit of 500 employees was set to limit
the analysis to SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises).  As a result of this
second step, the number of firms retained for all subsequent analyses dropped
slightly to 140, 109 and 135, respectively, for the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada,
giving us a total sample of 384 firms.  Third, several variables were included in all
statistical analyses as control variables since some of the firms' characteristics (such
as size) as well as contextual factors (such as the degree of influence of prime
contractors over decisions made by the subcontracting firms) may have had an
impact on the relationship between capabilities and performance.
4.  Results and discussion
Statistical analyses were conducted in three distinct and consecutive phases.  First,
the mean scores on the critical capabilities of firms from the calibration sample
allowed for the development of an ideal profile which must to be significantly
different from the profile of remaining firms in the study sample (table 1).  We then
turned to the second phase, where we examined the relationship between the degree
of overall correlation with the ideal profile and the performance of firms in the study
sample (table 2).  Significant negative correlation coefficients were expected since
large variations from the ideal profile would normally result in poor performance.
In the third and final phase, relationships between performance and the degree of
adherence for each capability to the ideal profile were analyzed (table 3); this
provides a better understanding of the relative contribution of each capability to firm
performance.
4.1  The ideal profile of best aerospace subcontractors
Two subsamples are derived from our final sample of 384 firms (Figure 2).  The
best-performing firms (n  = 37) represent the calibration sample .  The study1 7
sample consists of all the remaining firms with the exception of the bottom 10
percent: removal of the worst-performing firms is necessary to obtain an unbiased
sample domain.  The size of the study sample (n ) is therefore 309 firms .2 8
Figure 2
Study sample vs. calibration sample (n = 384)
.
worst-performing
 firms
(n3 = 38)
study sample
 (n2 = 309)
calibration
 sample
 (n1 = 37)
very
low
10%
90%
Cumulative
percentage of
firms
Perfor mance
0%
very
high
100%
.
.
.
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Table 1 presents the profiles of firms in the two subsamples (calibration vs. study
samples) as well as levels of significance of bivariate tests for the difference in
means (Mann-Whitney).  As hypothesized, firms in the calibration sample display
significantly higher mean scores for the majority of capabilities (8 out of 12).
However, the scores for four critical capabilities, namely R&D, levels of adoption
of computer-based administrative applications and advanced manufacturing
technologies, and the stability of networks with customers/suppliers, are higher in
the study sample than in the ideal profile, although not significantly.  This rather
surprising result is explained by the fact that some capabilities are linked to a firm's
size.  In fact, as we turn to the control variables (last four rows in table 1), we notice
that the best-performing firms are significantly smaller.  This is no more the case
10
Table 1
Profiles of firms in the calibration sample (ideal profile) and in the study sample
Mean scores Level of significance for unilateral tests
Calibration Study
sample sample
(n  = 37) (n  = 309)1 2
Without size as a With size as a
control variable control variable
P P
(M-W) (ANCOVA)1 6
Critical capabilities:
C Technological capabilities
 - R&D investments     2.87%     3.52% NS NS
 - Technological scanning 5.28 5.16 0.0938* 0.0010***2
 - Level of employees'    
technical/scientific expertise2 6.32 5.32 0.0000**** 0.0000****
 - Level of adoption of computer-based
   administrative applications3 3.59 3.64 NS 0.0000****
 - Level of adoption of advanced
   manufacturing technologies3 2.27 2.67 NS 0.0000****
 - Level of adoption of manufacturing
   improvement programs3 1.62 1.33 0.0683* 0.0000****
 - Exclusive and unique know-how
related to 5.84 5.14 0.0014*** 0.0065***
   firm's products2
C Managerial capabilities
 - Management skills 6.29 4.96 0.0000**** 0.0000****2
 - Marketing skills 4.75 4.27 0.0704* 0.0225**2
 - Stability of networks with
   customers/suppliers2 3.92 4.90 NS NS
 - Financial stability 5.91 4.96 0.0001**** 0.0000****2
 - Reputation 6.68 5.94 0.0000**** 0.0000****2
Control variables
 - Size 14.87 15.71 0.0015 *** NS4
 - Level of dependency  on prime5
contractors
32.40 31.40 NS NS
 - Level of expectations  from prime2
contractors
4.37 4.51 NS NS
 - Level of influence  of prime2
contractors
2.99 2.90 NS NS
NS Not significant *  p < 0.10   **  p < 0.05   ***  p < 0.01   ****  p < 0.001
1 The Mann-Whitney test (non-parametric test of differences in means) is used here since the
 Computer-based administrative and production technologies are as follow: General accounting9
applications (accounts payable/receivable, payroll, billing, etc); costing; inventory management; net
needs planning (MRP I) and manufacturing resource planning (MRP II) systems; job order costing;
electronic data interchange (EDI) with outside organizations or companies; computer-assisted design
(CAD); integrated CAD/CAM; computerized numerical control (CNC) tools; direct numerical control
(DNC) tools; automated handling; bar code system; computerized quality inspection and control.
Manufacturing improvement programs include: Just-in-time (JIT) system; statistical process control
(control cards); employee accountability.
 One-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is an extension of analysis of variance (ANOVA) and10
is designed to assess the effects of independent variable(s) on a single dependent variable after the effects
of one or more covariates (here, size) are accounted for.
 For the slipt-half method, the 384 firms are randomly split in two sub-samples of equal size. For the11
“jackknife method”, samples are repeatedly drawn from to the original sample of 384 firms on the
“leave-one-out” principle. The same bivariate tests (Mann-Whitney and ANCOVA) and multivariate
analysis (discriminant analysis) allow one to test the significant differences between  the two groups
based on subsamples derived from either method. Even with the “slipt-half method”, which is the most
11
two subsamples vary drastically in size.  T-tests give similar results.
2 Based on 7-point Likert scales.
3 Based on the actual number of technologies/programs being implemented (respectively 4,
6 and 3 for administrative applications, advanced manufacturing technologies and
manufacturing improvement programs). See note  at the bottom of the page for more9
information.
4 Expressed as the natural logarithm of total annual sales in order to normalize this variable.
5 Percentage of sales realized from 1, 2 or 3 major customers.
6 See note  at the bottom of the page for more details.10
when size is controlled for.  Values for all of the four variables not only become
greater for firms in the calibration sample, they are also significantly different from
firms in the study sample.  In fact, the ideal profile becomes significantly different
for the two capabilities linked to the levels of adoption of new technologies
(p = 0.0000) once size is controlled for (ANCOVA test).  This confirms previous
results that size still plays a major role with respect to increased automation even
within SMEs [17].  This strongly suggests that one should systematically include the
effect of size as a prime control variable.  Notice that the three remaining control
variables are not significantly different across the two sub-samples.
Are the results in table 1 credible enough to carry out subsequent statistical
analyses?  First, discriminant analysis further validates in a multivariate manner the
differences between the profiles of firms found in the two subsamples as displayed
in table 1.  The discriminant function is highly significant (p < 0.0000) and yields
to a perfect classification rate for the best-performing firms (100%) and a highly
satisfactory classification rate (87.7%) for the firms in the study sample.  Second,
the results are stable based either on the “slipt-half method” or the “jackknife
method” . Third, a three-group analysis (best performers n  = 37; study sample11 1
demanding, results are stable.
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n  = 309; worst performers n  = 38) also yields significant differences between the2 3
means on a three-group basis (Kruskal-Wallis and ANCOVA tests).  Furthermore,
the inclusion of the bottom 10% of firms in the study sample obviously results in
lower scores for all critical capabilities than those observed for the study sample
alone, suggesting that the differences revealed in table 1 between the two
subsamples of firms are in fact conservative. Finally, the best-performing
subcontractors are not confined to one country but distributed across the three
countries (17 for the U.S.A., 11 for Canada and 9 for the U.K.), as is to be expected
for an industry with a global subcontracting base.  Based on these observations, the
results are judged to be stable and valid enough to turn to the next phase of the
statistical analysis.
4.2  The degree of overall adherence to the ideal profile as an indicator of
performance
Table 2 summarizes the relationships between the overall degree of adherence to
the ideal profile and performance for all firms from the study sample and for each
of the three countries involved.
This table reveals some interesting results.  First, all correlation coefficients are
negative, as hypothesized, and most are significant:  the more firms diverge from the
ideal profile, the lower their performance.  Second, the degree of correlation with
the ideal profile for managerial capabilities shows stronger links to performance
than is observed for technological capabilities.  This is true for all three countries
pooled together and for each country taken separately.  Technological capabilities
may be considered as a priori conditions for dealing with prime contractors.  Once
these are acquired, managerial capabilities may very well make the difference and
lead to superior performance.  Continued excellence therefore depends not only on
technological capabilities but also on strong managerial capabilities, even in a high-
technology industry such as aerospace.  Third, some differences are observed
between the U.S.A. and U.K., on one hand, and Canada, on the other hand, given
that weaker correlation coefficients are observed for Canadian subcontractors.
However, these differences are not statistically significant (last column of table 2).
Table 2
Relationships  between performance and the overall degree of adherence to1
rpo.k'
rpo&rkp&rko
(1&r 2kp)(1&r 2ko)
(z' 1
2
ln( 1%r
1&r
))
 When controlling for size, correlation coefficients (table 2) are calculated as follows: 12
where p = performance; 0 = overall degree of adherence to the ideal profile and k = control
variable (i.e. size).Similarly, correlation coefficients between each critical capability and
performance allows one to control for the effect of size in table 3.
 The correlation coefficients are not significantly different at p = 0.10 between the countries taken two13
by two (table 2) on the basis of the one-tailed Fisher’s z transformed test .
13
the ideal profile (study sample n  = 309)2
Overall degree
of adherence
All three
countries
U.S.A. U.K. Canada P
All critical - 0.34 **** - 0.42 **** - 0.38 **** - 0.32 *** NS
capabilities
Technological - 0.17 ** - 0.29 *** - 0.30 *** - 0.18 NS
capabilities
Managerial - 0.31 **** - 0.35 **** - 0.33 **** - 0.29 *** NS
capabilities
1 Spearman correlation coefficients (controlling for size). See note  at the12
bottom of the page.
*  p < 0.10   **  p < 0.05   ***  p < 0.01   ****  p < 0.001
N.S. non significant; Using one-tailed Fisher’s z transformed test. See note2
 at the bottom of the page. 13
4.3  Strategic benchmarking across the three countries: the most critical
capabilities
14
Table 3 sheds some additional light on the relationship between performance and
the observed deviations from the ideal profile.  In order to effectively display the
results, only the five most significant and largest negative correlation coefficients
are ranked in decreasing order (where rank 1 represents the strongest negative
correlation coefficient).  This is done for all firms in the study sample and for
American, British and Canadian subcontractors separately.  Managerial skills seem
Table 3
Most critical capabilities ) Strategic benchmarking
Critical capabilities:
Ranks1
All countries U.S.A. U.K. Canada
C Technological
capabilities
 - Level of adoption of
computer-based 4 4 4 4
administrative applications
 - Level of adoption of
manu-facturing - 5 5 -
improvement programs
 - Exclusive and unique
know-how related to firm's 2 2 3 5
products
C Managerial capabilities
 - Managerial skills 1 1 1 2
 - Stability of networks
with customers/suppliers 3 3 - 3
 - Reputation 5 - 2 1
Ranks are here based on the correlation coefficients (controlling for size effect). See note 12 at1
the bottom of page 13.
Rank 1: first strongest negative correlation coefficient
Rank 5: fifth strongest negative correlation coefficient 
to be the most critical capabilities, as deviations from the level of managerial skills
observed in the best-performing firms are systematically related to poorer
 Because of their purchasing power and lower costs of production, subcontract manufacturing will14
increasingly take place in Asian countries. For example, the Korean Manufacturing Program, covering
120 F-16 aircraft, illustrates how capabilities are gradually being acquired by the recipient countries:
“Stage 1 consists of 12 aircraft bought off-the-shelf, stage 2 covers 36 aircraft assembled; and Stage
3 includes license production of 72 aircraft by Samsung Aerospace (...) Koreanisation of the F-16
will represent 40% of the total engine, 33% of avionics and 52% of undercarriage”
 [19].
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performance in all countries.  Deviations from a very unique and exclusive know-
how also have a significant negative impact on performance, although a bit less so
for Canadian subcontractors, which are known to be operating in niche markets.
Surprisingly, the adoption of computer-based administrative applications such as
inventory management, MRP I and II, job order costing or EDI with external
organizations is the fourth most critical capability, while the adoption of advanced
manufacturing technologies does not play a significant role.  Finally, the stability of
networks with customers and suppliers seems to be more important in a large
domestic market such as the United States while reputation has a more predominant
role in Canada and U.K.
5.  Conclusion
Both strategic benchmarking and fit as deviation profile allow us to identify and
measure the gaps between the best and the other subcontractors and to increase our
understanding of the critical capabilities needed by aerospace subcontracting firms.
These two concepts are useful for the aerospace industry where competitive
excellence is constantly subjected to worldwide competitive pressures and to the
entry of new competitors from the new emerging markets.  As a given level of
excellence observed at a particular point in time tends to degrade naturally over
time, the ideal profile derived from the calibration sample is, without a doubt, time-
sensitive and will need to be continuously recalibrated.  Thus, the next calibration
sample should include other foreign subcontractors, in particular Asian ones which
are in the process of building world-class capabilities .14
This paper focuses on today’s demonstrated world-class capabilities of Western
aerospace manufacturing subcontractors and provides strong empirical evidence
supporting four broad observations.  First, the best-performing aerospace
subcontractors, which are not necessarily the largest firms, display a significant set
of stronger critical capabilities.  Second, the overall degree of adherence to the ideal
profile (best subcontractors) is a good indicator of performance:  the closer firms
adhere to this ideal profile, the better they perform.  Third, although technological
superiority is essential to aerospace subcontractors' performance, large deviations
with respect to managerial capabilities are linked more strongly to weaker
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performance.  Fourth, subcontractors from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada differ
slightly in terms of the degree of adherence to the ideal profile but share a common
set of most critical capabilities, which in turn provides an additional demonstration
of the internationalization of the aerospace industry.
Some findings are of particular interest and have profound implications. The most
critical capabilities subcontractors need to acquire in order to compete with the best
are either intangible such as managerial skills, difficult to imitate such as exclusive
and unique know how, or not easily transferable such as reputation and stability of
upstream and downstream business networks, which is often the result of historical
trustworthy relationships. Furthermore, a close look at the prevailing technologies
indicates that the adoption of the so-called “soft” and more difficult to implement
technologies such as manufacturing improvement programs or computer-based
administrative applications constitutes a more important gap to fill by the less
performing firms than the adoption of “hard” manufacturing technologies such as
computerized numerical control tools (CNC) or automated handling.  This suggests
that the learning cycle for the acquisition of these most critical capabilities may be
longer to achieve than would be the case for a straightforward buildup of existing
resources such as additional machinery or manpower and thus constitutes an
important barrier for existing firms or new entrants aiming at competing with the
best Western subcontractors.
In the short term, for those firms identified as the best subcontractors and
possessing the above-mentioned capabilities, it translates into a strong competitive
positioning. On the other hand, competitive pressure on the worst-performing firms
will increase considerably as new entrants from the emerging markets will be able
to offer comparable capabilities in the rather near future. This, coupled with the fact
that, in the coming years, selection of subcontractors will be motivated by
considerations that go beyond geographical proximity, leads us to think that, in this
new order of doing business, only the best will survive.
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